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OF ALL THE GIN JOINTS: HARRIS
AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
RELUCTANT JURISPRUDENCE ON
PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING
ANDREW BELLIS*
INTRODUCTION
Rick: How can you close me up? On what grounds?
Captain Renault: I’m shocked . . . shocked to find that gambling is
going on in there.
Croupier: Your winnings sir.
1
Captain Renault: [sotto voce] Oh, thank you very much.

The Supreme Court has shown great reluctance to expand its
jurisprudence on partisanship in redistricting. Like Renault’s attitude
towards gambling, the Supreme Court has consistently allowed
partisanship to influence the legislative redistricting process,
condemning it only when it is forced into the light because it has gone
2
“too far.”
As a result, courts have had a difficult time discerning the
3
motivations for drawing legislative maps. If a change has the effect of
furthering a legitimate state policy while also promoting a partisan
end, the Court has given little guidance on how to proceed. To further
complicate the matter, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
4
5
compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a legitimate state rationale,
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017. Andrew wishes to thank
Professor Guy-Uriel Charles and J. Gerald Hebert for their support in the writing of this article.
He would also like to thank his father, Peter Bellis, for helping him use films to explore and
explain even the most abstract of topics.
1. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
2. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting most Justices
believed partisanship “is a traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not
go too far”).
3. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (rejecting
a political gerrymandering claim).
4. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
5. See, e.g., Abrams v Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977
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but recently invalidated the coverage formula under Section 4(b) of
the Act, freeing all covered states (including Arizona) from the
6
requirement to seek preclearance for all new legislative maps.
7
Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission turns on
two questions: First, if partisanship can justify population deviations
8
from the Equal Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote standard;
9
and second, if attempting to obtain preclearance from the
Department of Justice is a valid justification for population deviations,
even after Shelby County v. Holder.
This Commentary will detail the facts of the case and describe the
current state of the law on partisanship and preclearance as
justifications for population deviations. Next, it will outline the threejudge panel’s holding. Then, it will sketch out each party’s arguments
regarding the two issues on appeal. Finally, it will analyze the
competing arguments and conclude that the Supreme Court should
affirm the lower court, holding that although neither partisanship nor
preclearance are acceptable justifications for population deviations,
the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission’s final map did
not contain sizeable enough deviations to establishing a prima facie
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) is a
commission created by a 2000 state ballot initiative to design new
maps for state legislative districts based on the federal census every
10
ten years. AIRC is comprised of five individuals: two Democrats
chosen by Democratic leadership in the state house and state senate
respectively, two Republicans chosen by Republican leadership in the

(1996).
6. Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2015).
7. 14-232 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2015).
8. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254–55 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (explaining that a
wide disparity in voting strength between large and small counties within a state will give rise to
an equal protection claim.)
9. Preclearance is a process in which states submit proposed voting changes to the
Department of Justice in order to gain assurance that the changes will not trigger subsequent
litigation from the federal government.
10. Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050–51 (D. Ariz.
2014) (per curiam), prob. juris. noted, 135 S. Ct. 2926 (2015).
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state house and state senate respectively, and one Independent
11
selected to chair the commission by the other four members.
After the 2010 census, AIRC began its required mapping process
by creating “districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across
12
the state.” AIRC ultimately voted to adopt a grid map beginning in
the southeast corner of the state and moving inwards in a clockwise
13
14
fashion with a maximum population deviation of 4.07 percent.
AIRC then began to adjust the map to “comply with the United
States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act” per state
15
constitutional directive. AIRC also took into account five other
factors required by the Arizona Constitution: “(1) equality of
population between districts; (2) geographic compactness and
contiguity; (3) respect for communities of interest; (4) respect for
visible geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and
16
undivided census tracts; and (5) competitiveness.” Until this point,
AIRC appeared to be largely unified in its map considerations, but
one key question threatened to disrupt the entire process: How many
17
benchmark districts existed in the previous map?
The total number of benchmark districts represents the number of
districts where minorities are able to elect a candidate of their
18
choosing. A potential redistricting map has an impermissible effect
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act if it “would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
19
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” In practice, the new
redistricting plan cannot create fewer districts in which minorities
20
have the ability to elect candidates of their choosing. At the time of
AIRC’s work, all potential new maps made by the commission were
subject to preclearance by the Department of Justice to ensure no
21
retrogression would take place.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 1053 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)).
13. Population deviation is the difference between the most populated district and the least
populated district divided by the average population of a district.
14. Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. Typically, any deviation less than 10% is considered
acceptable. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (2014).
15. Id. at 1055 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)).
16. Id. (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)).
17. Id. at 1056–57.
18. Id. at 1053–54.
19. Id. at 1054 (quoting Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1055.
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For AIRC, there was disagreement over exactly how many
22
benchmark districts existed in the old map. In an initial presentation
to AIRC before it began adjusting the grid map, Bruce Adelson, the
commission’s mapping and Voting Rights Act consultant, stated that
23
he had found nine benchmark districts in the 2002 map. However,
AIRC soon began contemplating the existence of ten benchmark
districts based on the fact that a few districts where minorities did not
make up a majority of the population were still consistently able to
24
elect minority candidates. Uncertain of how many benchmark
districts the Department of Justice would find in its review of the new
plan, AIRC followed the advice of counsel, opting to go the safe route
and include ten benchmark districts—seven minority-majority
25
districts and another three ability-to-elect districts. This rough draft
26
was then approved by a 4-1 vote.
After the vote, AIRC continued to take advice from its attorneys
and consultants as to whether or not ten benchmark districts was the
27
proper total. AIRC received a draft racial polarization voting
analysis prepared by hired experts, confirming that minorities would
be able to elect candidates of their choice in all ten proposed
28
benchmark districts. “The Commission also received advice [from
Adelson] that it could use population shifts, within certain limits, to
strengthen [benchmark] districts,” and that such a course of action
would be “prudent” given the uncertainty regarding the Department
29
of Justice’s preclearance procedures.
AIRC ultimately adopted changes to Districts 24 and 26 aimed at
30
increasing the minority populations’ ability to elect in each district.
Shortly after the adoption, however, the Commission also began to
31
consider changes to Districts 8 and 11. While Adelson felt that AIRC
could turn District 8 into another ability-to-elect district if it nudged
the minority population up slightly, the two Republican
Commissioners worried that the change would result in

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1059.
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“hyperpacking” Republican voters into District 11 to favor
32
Democratic voters in District 8. A Democratic Commissioner noted
that making districts more competitive was one of the five criteria set
for AIRC to consider and expressed support because the change
33
would make District 8 more competitive. AIRC ultimately voted 3-2
to implement the changes to Districts 8 and 11—the only set of
34
changes to the draft map that resulted in a split vote.
In early 2012, AIRC voted 3-2 to approve the final legislative map
35
with both Republican Commissioners voting against it. The
36
maximum population deviation of the final map was 8.8%. The map
was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance and
37
received approval shortly thereafter.
Appellants sought an injunction against the map, a declaration
that the final legislative map violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and a mandate that AIRC draw a new
38
map for all elections after 2012. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), a
39
three-judge panel was convened. After deciding several pre-trial
motions, including dismissing a state law claim and dismissing the
Commissioners from the suit in their individual capacities, the three40
judge panel presided over a five day bench trial.
The panel ultimately held that Appellants had the burden of proof
to show that the deviations from district to district did not result from
the implementation of legitimate redistricting policies and that
41
Appellants had failed to meet their burden. The panel determined
that because the deviations in population amounted to less than 10%,
Appellants lacked the requisite facts to show “a prima facie case of a
42
one-person, one-vote violation” and shift the burden onto the state.
The panel also concluded that Appellants failed to show that the
illegitimate criteria, in this case partisan political motivations,
43
predominated over other legitimate criteria. Finally, the panel held
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1072–73.
Id. at 1071–72.
Id. at 1073.
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that seeking preclearance under the Voting Rights Act is a legitimate
44
and rational goal in the redistricting process.
Appellants appealed the three-judge panel’s decision to the
45
Supreme Court. There, the Court noted jurisdiction of the case for
46
two questions : “Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one
political party justify creating legislative districts of unequal
population that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle of
the Equal Protection Clause?” and “Does the desire to obtain
favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the
creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one47
vote principle,” even after Shelby County v. Holder?
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Partisan Redistricting
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the drawing of
legislative districts which dilute the voting power of citizens of certain
48
districts is justiciable and prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause
49
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although a population deviation is
permitted if it is based on “legitimate considerations incident to the
50
effectuation of rational state policy,” the state must justify that
51
deviation if the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case. Minor
population deviations, however, are insufficient to establish a prima
52
facie case, and a “plan with a maximum population deviation under
53
10% [generally] falls within this category of minor deviations.” This
does not mean that deviation under 10% shields the state from
liability; rather, it keeps the burden on the plaintiff to establish that
54
illegitimate criteria predominated the state’s considerations.
44. Id. at 1074.
45. Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
No. 14-232 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2014).
46. Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015).
47. Brief for Appellants at i, Harris (U.S. Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
48. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
49. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (“The Equal Protection Clause
demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all
places as well as of all races.”).
50. Id. at 579.
51. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (2014).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (summarily affirming the invalidation of a
map with 9.98% maximum population deviation).
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Although it had touched on the question in previous decisions, the
Supreme Court first analyzed the justiciability of partisan
55
justifications for population deviation in Davis v. Bandemer. There,
Indiana Democrats challenged a redistricting map that led to only 43
Democrats winning seats out of 100 available in the Indiana House of
Representatives despite Democrats garnering 51.9% of the vote in all
56
house races. The Court ultimately determined that, based on its
precedents with other types of constituencies including racial
57
gerrymandering cases, such claims are in fact justiciable. But beyond
that, the Court was unable to determine a standard for prima facie
cases of partisan gerrymandering, choosing instead to conclude that
the district court applied an insufficiently demanding standard when
58
it found a less than 2% deviation unconstitutional.
Eighteen years later, the Supreme Court again examined partisan
59
motivations in redistricting in Vieth v. Jubelirer. There the Court
examined a map put in place by Pennsylvania Republicans “as a
punitive measure against Democrats for having enacted pro60
Democrat redistricting plans elsewhere.” The Supreme Court
affirmed a dismissal of the claim against the map in a 5-4 decision but
61
had only four votes in favor of overruling Davis v. Bandemer. Justice
Kennedy concurred in the judgement, noting that partisan
gerrymandering claims face two obstacles: “the lack of comprehensive
and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries” and “the
62
absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.” Despite
his inability to find an acceptable standard, Justice Kennedy did not
join the rest of the majority in overturning Davis because the
arguments were “not so compelling as that they require us now to bar
63
all future claims of injury from a partisan gerrymander.”
In the wake of Kennedy’s concurrence, the Supreme Court did not
take up the question of partisan redistricting again until Harris.
Despite its silence on the issue the Court did find “an intentional
effort to allow incumbent Democrats to maintain or increase their

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 113–14.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 272.
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 306–07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 309.
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64

delegation” based on the new legislative map. Given the Court’s
previous symmetrical reasoning between racial and political
65
gerrymandering, it could also draw on recent jurisprudence in the
racial gerrymandering context. The Court recently held in Alabama
66
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama that the equal population goal
is the background of redistricting, “taken as a given, when
67
determining whether race, or other factors, predominate.” Given this
statement of law, it seems likely that the Court will move in a similar
way in its analysis of partisan redistricting if it finds the case at hand
justiciable.
B. Section 5 Preclearance as a Goal of Redistricting
Prior to Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court consistently
held that general compliance with the Voting Rights Act was a
legitimate reason for population deviations in the redistricting
68
process. Although the Court has never specifically addressed
whether or not the goal of obtaining preclearance from the
Department of Justice through Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is
69
also a legitimate reason for deviations, in LULAC v. Perry, eight
justices found obtaining preclearance to be a “compelling state
70
interest.”
Despite this strong backing, the Court’s decision in Shelby County
71
drastically altered the voting rights landscape. Although it struck
down the coverage formula section of the act rather than the
72
preclearance section, the Court seemed to suggest that the reasoning
behind the Voting Rights Act itself and subsequent judicial decisions
relying on that reasoning are no longer valid because the Voting

64. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 947 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125–26 (1986).
66. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
67. Id. at 1270.
68. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977
(1996).
69. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
70. Id. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined in
relevant part by Roberts, C.J., Thomas & Alito, JJ.); id. at 475 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part, joined in relevant part by Breyer, J.); id. at 485 n.2 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
71. See Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rowher, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The
Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2015) (“Shelby Cty. marks the death of
the VRA as a superstatute.”).
72. Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2015).
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73

Rights Act itself is no longer necessary. However, the Court has not
addressed any question regarding the constitutionality of Section 5
since Shelby County, and it explicitly chose not to rule Section 5
74
unconstitutional at the time.
III. HOLDING
A. Partisan Redistricting
The three-judge panel began its opinion under the assumption
that partisanship was not a legitimate reason for population deviation
75
in redistricting. The panel found that the primary factor behind
population deviation between the districts was AIRC’s attempt to
comply with the Voting Rights Act and receive preclearance from the
76
Department of Justice. Moreover, the court found that the maximum
population deviation was less than 10%, leaving the plaintiffs with the
77
burden to prove a prima facie case.
The panel also noted that, in this case, it was especially difficult to
78
separate legitimate reasons for deviations from illegitimate ones. In
Arizona, the legitimate rationale of increasing minority ability-toelect districts paralleled the (assumed) illegitimate rationale of
79
increasing the prospects of electing Democratic candidates.
Ultimately, the bipartisan support from the Commissioners for the
changes leading to the population deviations “undermine[d] the
notion that partisanship, rather than compliance with the Voting
80
Rights Act, was what motivated those deviations.”
B. Section 5 Preclearance as a Goal of Redistricting
The panel concluded that “compliance with the Voting Rights Act
is among the legitimate redistricting criteria that can justify minor
81
population deviations.” The panel first relied on the Supreme

73. Charles & Fuentes-Rowhar, supra note 71, at 1421–22.
74. See Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2015) (“We issue no holding on
§ 5. . . .”).
75. Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (D. Ariz.
2014) (per curiam).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1060.
78. Id. at 1061.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1073.
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Court’s decision in Bush v. Vera, noting that if compliance with the
Voting Rights Act were not a legitimate state policy, “we doubt that
the Court would have assumed in Vera that it is a compelling state
82
interest.” The three-judge panel rejected Appellants’ argument that
the Voting Rights Act cannot serve as such an interest because the
83
text of the Act does not explicitly allow population deviations.
The panel also held that its decision was not altered by the recent
84
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder. Shelby County
did not control because it pertained to the coverage formula for
85
preclearance rather than to preclearance itself. Although the
decision in Shelby County may have rendered preclearance as a
requirement inapplicable, it did not hold that Section 5 itself was
86
unconstitutional.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Harris’s Arguments
Harris argues that the panel found two reasons for the population
deviations in AIRC’s final map: partisan benefits on behalf of the
Democratic Party and preclearance approval from the Department of
87
Justice. He contends that neither of these reasons “justifies deviating
88
from this Court’s one-person, one-vote principle.” Harris also relies
on the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance in Larios v. Cox to show
that population deviations of less than 10% still require justification
89
in the first place.
Harris first argues that AIRC’s final map contained population
deviations due to partisanship and that such a goal does not justify
deviating from the Equal Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote
90
standard. According to Harris, the three-judge panel was correct in
its assumption that unequally apportioning a legislature in order to
gain a partisan advantage is an illegitimate reason for population

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id.
Brief for Appellants, supra note 47, at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 22.
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91

deviations. However, the panel failed to properly understand how
much influence partisanship had on the final map for Arizona’s
92
apportionment. Partisanship was actually the only possibly
legitimate reason for the population deviations because seeking
preclearance from the Department of Justice is no longer a valid
reason for deviating from the one-person, one-vote standard after
93
Shelby County v. Holder.
Harris next argues that the Voting Rights Act never required
94
states to make districts of unequal population, but even if it had in
95
the past, Shelby County eliminated that justification. The benchmark
96
map for Arizona from 2000 had seven ability-to-elect districts.
Although creating fewer than seven ability-to-elect districts in the
current map would have triggered retrogression and prevented the
map from getting preclearance, Harris claims that nothing in the
Voting Rights Act required AIRC to create three additional ability97
to-elect districts. “The Department of Justice has never required
unequal population for preclearance in the 48 years of administering
98
Section 5.” Further, “[t]he Justice Department’s own manual states
preventing retrogression under Section 5 does not require
99
jurisdictions to violate the one-person, one-vote principle.”
Even if creating additional ability-to-elect districts at one point
justified deviations from the one-person, one-vote principle, Harris
argues that in the wake of Shelby County such justifications are
100
void. He contends that even though the map was drawn before
Shelby County, its holding still applies, just as any school segregated
under Plessy v. Ferguson would not be exempt from the Supreme
101
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Instead, Harris

91. Id. at 24.
92. See id. at 28 (“The only issue that divided the three judges was whether obtaining a
partisan advantage was the ‘predominant’ motive (Judge Clifton) or the ‘actual and sole’ motive
(Judge Silver)”) (citing Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1072
n.10, 1085 (D. Ariz. 2014) (per curiam)).
93. Id. at 48–49.
94. Id. at 41.
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. at 41.
97. Id. at 41–42.
98. Id. at 43 (quoting Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1103 (D. Ariz. 2015) (Wake, J., dissenting)).
99. Id. (quoting Justice Department Guidance Concerning Redistricting under Section
5, 76 Fed. Reg. 7470, 7472 (Feb. 9, 2011)) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 46.
101. Id.
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argues the Court should invalidate any justification based on
preclearance because it is unconstitutional to apply Section 5
102
anywhere.
B. AIRC’s Arguments
AIRC advances two core arguments: first, the population
deviations at issue fall within the permissible range of 10% and do not
103
require justification without Harris establishing a prima facie case;
and second, even if justifications were required, the district court
correctly found that the deviations between districts in the final map
104
were justified.
AIRC’s first argument relies on a lack of precedent for its
105
rejoinder. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that states do not
have to adhere to perfect equality when constructing state legislative
106
districts. Further, “the Supreme Court has never held that a state
must justify population deviations of less than 10% in a state
107
legislative redistricting plan,” because minor population deviations
among districts do not substantially dilute the strength of individual
votes to the point that those voters are deprived of fair and effective
108
representation. Perfect mathematical precision is impossible, so the
burden remains on the plaintiff in cases where deviations are less than
109
10%.
AIRC also distinguishes Larios v. Cox, Harris’s primary case for
110
requiring justifications from states for deviations less than 10%.
AIRC argues that, unlike the Commissioners here, in Larios the
Georgia legislature gave no good faith effort towards legitimate goals

102. See id. at 47 (“To allow the current map to govern successive elections cycles until 2020
would give continuing force to Section 5 despite the unconstitutionality of applying it
anywhere.”) (quoting Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1100
(D. Ariz. 2014) (Wake, J., dissenting)).
103. Brief of Appellee at 28, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’m, No. 14-232 (U.S.
Sept. 4, 2015).
104. Id. at 37.
105. See id. at 29 (noting that the Supreme Court has never held that a prima facie case
exists with less than 10% population deviation).
106. Id. at 29–30 (citing Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1262–63
(2015); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1977); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321–22
(1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964)).
107. Id. at 29.
108. Id. at 30 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973)).
109. Id. at 33–34.
110. Id. at 34.
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111

in its redistricting process. Additionally, AIRC notes that the Larios
decision was a summary affirmance and argues that the Supreme
Court does not “make new law in a summary affirmance like
112
Larios.”
AIRC’s second argument relies on the three-judge panel’s finding
that the primary reason for any population deviations was the
legitimate goal of achieving preclearance from the Department of
113
Justice. AIRC notes first that this is a factual finding and thus “is
114
entitled to deference and reviewed only for clear error.” This
deference is due to the panel’s close proximity to the facts of the case
115
and the ability to best judge the credibility of witnesses. As a result,
the only option with de novo review available to Harris is to argue
that as a matter of law, preclearance itself is not a legitimate rationale
116
for deviations in the redistricting process.
In response to Harris’s arguments on this point, AIRC first points
to the Supreme Court’s decision in LULAC v. Perry, where eight
justices endorsed the idea that compliance with Section 5 is a
117
compelling state interest, “and thus necessarily a rational one.”
AIRC further notes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
compliance with the Voting Rights Act generally is a rational state
118
interest. Finally, AIRC observes that while the Voting Rights Act
did not require Arizona to have unequally populated districts, it did
require Arizona to seek preclearance from the Department of Justice,
which drove AIRC to create ten ability-to-elect districts in the first
119
place.
In response to Harris’s final argument, AIRC claims that
“[r]elying on Shelby County to invalidate Arizona’s election map
120
Shelby County invalidated the coverage
would be perverse.”
formula of the Voting Rights Act because “it imposed unjustified

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 38.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 41.
117. Id. at 42–43 (citing LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 518 (2006) ((Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 475 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 485 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
118. Id. at 43 (citing Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
977 (1996)).
119. Id. at 45.
120. Id. at 53.
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burdens on the residual sovereignty of the States over their elections
121
by subjecting them to federal oversight.” AIRC argues that here,
Arizona, through its agent AIRC, chose to prioritize preclearance in
order to further its own sovereignty by “keeping the final decision on
122
its map out of the hands of the federal courts.” Moreover, AIRC
contends that the decision in Shelby County invalidated the coverage
formula under Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, not Section 5 as
123
Harris argues. Finally, AIRC argues that Shelby County’s controlling
statement of law on the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act is
124
immaterial to the governing substantive law in this case. AIRC
claims that at most, the law requires that minor deviations in
populations between districts be “based on legitimate considerations
125
incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.” Thus, as long
as Arizona was required to seek preclearance when it created the
map, AIRC acted legitimately in implementing a rational state
126
policy.
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should find in favor of AIRC. Although the Court
should hold that neither partisanship nor the desire to obtain
preclearance from the Department of Justice can justify the creation
of legislative districts which deviate from the Equal Protection
Clause’s one-person, one-vote standard, the Court should ultimately
find that the deviations in Arizona’s map are minor and that as a
result, Harris has not satisfied the clear error burden required to
overturn the lower court’s finding that he failed to establish a prima
facie case.
A. Renault’s Valor: Discretion in the Contemplation of Partisan
Redistricting
Captain Renault: My dear Ricky, you overestimate the influence of
the Gestapo. I don’t interfere with them and they don’t interfere
with me. In Casablanca I am master of my fate! I am . . .
Police Officer: Major Strasser [of the Gestapo] is here, sir!

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2015)).
Id.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52.
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
Id. at 53.
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Rick: You were saying?
127
Captain Renault: Excuse me.

Like Captain Renault’s rebellion against his Nazi commanders,
the Supreme Court’s holdings on partisan redistricting have often
exercised discretion as the better part of their valor. Although the
Court has recognized that partisan influences on redistricting can be
128
problematic, it has refused to set standards that would give the
129
courts undue influence in politics. However, the Court’s reticence in
this field has come solely in political gerrymandering cases as opposed
130
to population deviation cases. This makes sense given the Court’s
more exacting scrutiny in population deviation cases. As a result, the
Court should be willing to set a clear standard for partisan
justifications in population deviation cases.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely the Court will decide to do so here.
Instead, the Court will likely follow Davis v. Bandemer, its first
political gerrymandering case. The Court will probably condemn
partisan influence on apportionment but fail to find a justiciable
standard for such cases. Like Captain Renault in the scene above, the
Court may trumpet its beliefs loudly but will likely fail to act on them
in a meaningful way.
B. Renault’s Wager: Compromising on Invalidation of the
Preclearance Justification
Captain Renault: This is the end of the chase.
Rick: Twenty thousand francs says it isn’t.
Captain Renault: Is that a serious offer?
Rick: I just paid out twenty. I’d like to get it back.
131
Captain Renault: Make it ten. I’m only a poor corrupt official.

Although some justices on the Court might wish to retroactively
disallow all use of preclearance justifications for population
deviations, the Court should ultimately only disallow such

127. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
128. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting most Justices
believed partisanship “is a traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not
go too far”).
129. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[C]ourts . . . would risk assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often
produces ill will and distrust.”).
130. Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1003 (2005).
131. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
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justifications going forward due to the excessive collateral
consequences of retroactive application. Some justices would surely
132
like to go further.
The ramifications of retroactively invalidating the seeking of
preclearance from the Department of Justice as a justification are
133
simply too great for the Supreme Court to allow. After the last
redistricting cycle, nine states and parts of seven more were covered
134
under the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act. “During the
2010 Census redistricting cycle, the Department of Justice alone made
a preclearance determination of 37 statewide redistricting plans in 11
135
States.” This does not include those states and counties that sought
preclearance from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
136
instead of the Department of Justice. A reversal of the lower court’s
decision would call into question the validity of each and every one of
those plans, especially if they relied primarily on preclearance as a
137
justification even if no partisan motivations were found. Ultimately,
the Court should exercise the same discretion it used in not recklessly
wading into the question of partisan motivations for gerrymandering
and decline to include retroactive application in its decision to
invalidate preclearance as a justification for population deviations.
C. Renault’s Bill: The Appellant’s Burden and the Prima Facie Case
Captain Renault: Oh no, Emil, please. A bottle of your best
champagne, and put it on my bill.
Emil: Very well, sir.
Victor Laszlo: Captain, please . . .
Captain Renault: Oh, please, monsieur. It is a little game we play.
138
They put it on the bill, I tear up the bill. It is very convenient.

Although the Court is likely to rule in favor of Harris (or tie, given
the current composition of the Court) on both of the substantive
questions, it should ultimately affirm the lower court’s judgment. The
Court has yet to determine whether or not partisanship and
132. See Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“I would find § 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as well.”).
133. See Brief of Former Officials of the U.S. Department of Justice Who Enforced the
Voting Rights Act as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 9, Harris v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, No. 14-232 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Brief of Former Officials].
134. Id. at 24.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 27.
138. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
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preclearance are permissible justifications for population deviation,
but it has spoken on when the state has the burden of showing such
justifications in the first place. “Our decisions have established, as a
general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum
population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor
139
deviations.” Here, the maximum population deviation of 8.8%
clearly falls into the minor deviations category. As a result, no prima
facie case is established by the deviations alone and Harris failed to
establish one at trial by proving that illegitimate justifications
predominated over legitimate ones when the map was made. The
lower court’s predomination standard for illegitimate criteria tracks
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama of racial gerrymandering justifications. If the Supreme
Court seeks to create consistency on justifications for both racial and
political claims and it declines to risk thousands of potential
redistricting maps by retroactively removing preclearance as a valid
justification, then it must affirm the lower court’s judgement.
Moreover, the Court, through Justice Kennedy, has repeatedly
shown a reticence to drastically shift the jurisprudence for
140
redistricting questions. Although Justice Kennedy also appeared to
provide the “swing” vote in the drastic Shelby County decision, his
decisions in the voting rights context are clearly distinguishable from
141
his decisions in the redistricting context. As a result, it is likely that
he will continue to exercise his cautious approach to redistricting
questions and join the Court’s affirmance of the lower court’s
judgement.
CONCLUSION
The Court may have done its best to avoid entering the political
fray of the redistricting process but it will be unable to maintain that
evasion here. Like Rick the moment Ilsa walked into Sam’s, the
wheels have been set in motion and there is no going back. This will
be the Supreme Court’s first case on partisan redistricting in over a
decade and its second analysis related to the Voting Rights Act since

139. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (2014).
140. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. See Dale Ho, Two F’s for Formalism: Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral Patterns, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 403, 417
(2015) (examining the formalistic analysis of Kennedy’s plurality opinion in a vote dilution
case).
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Shelby County. Moreover, the Court should keep in mind the
potentially momentous effects its decision could have on other
142
redistricting plans. As a result, the Court should affirm the lower
court’s judgment, and compromise on the question of preclearance,
without bringing much additional clarity to its partisanship analysis in
its redistricting doctrine.

142. See Brief of Former Officials, supra note 133, at 9.

